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This paper explores the impact of airport noise regulation on airline service quality and airfares.
It also characterizes the socially optimal stringency of noise limits, taking both noise damage
and the various costs borne by airlines and their passengers into account. The analysis also
investigates the eﬀect of noise taxes, as well as the optimal level level of such taxes. Along
with the companion paper by Girvin (2006a), this work represents the ﬁrst complete theoretical
investigation into the economics of airport noise regulation using a model where the interests
of the key relevant stakeholders are captured.Airport Noise Regulation, Airline Service Quality,
and Social Welfare
by
Jan K. Brueckner and Raquel Girvin
1. Introduction
Despite dramatic reductions over the years in the noise produced by individual aircraft, air-
port noise remains a critical public policy issue today. Moreover, given the expected increases
in airline traﬃc and airport operations over the next decades, the noise issue will continue to
be a source of dissension. The nature of the problem is evident in the ongoing controversy
surrounding the planned expansion and reorientation of Chicago’s O’Hare airport. While the
expansion requires demolition of several hundred properties, it also reorients the airport’s ﬂight
paths, so that a new set of households will be exposed to noise (see McMillen (2004)). Both of
these anticipated eﬀects have led to vociferous opposition to the expansion from nearby resi-
dents, who have attempted to block the plan in court, despite its recent approval by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). Similarly, in Orange County, California, concerns about noise
exposure blocked the construction of a new international airport on a decommissioned military
airbase, even with a shortage of airport capacity in the region (Kranser (2002)). At nearby
John Wayne Airport, departing ﬂights must practice a steep, high-power climb maneuver to
quickly gain altitude before passing over the high-income community of Newport Beach, and
noise concerns in that community continue to limit daily ﬂight volume at the airport.1
The dramatic gains in aircraft “quietness” over the jet age, which have ironically accompa-
nied ongoing noise concerns, are illustrated by comparing noise from a recent-vintage Boeing
737-700 and a 1967-vintage 727-200. The newer aircraft produces only one-third as much per-
ceived takeoﬀ noise as its predecessor, despite similar passenger capacities. Because of such
gains in quietness, the number of U.S. residents exposed to signiﬁcant aircraft noise fell by a
factor of 16 between 1975 and 2000 despite a more than three-fold increase in airline traﬃc
over the period. However, even with such gains in noise abatement, Figure 1 shows sharply
1growing trends in various airport noise limits, such as operational curfews, noise quotas, and
noise surcharges, in the U.S. Such measures are even more widespread in Europe, as discussed
by Girvin (2000c).
Noiserestrictionsare likelyto haveimportant impactson airlineservicequalityand airfares.
Service quality may fall as various operational limits restrict ﬂight frequency, and the expense
of making aircraft quieter, which raises their purchase price and operating cost, may be passed
on in higher airfares. Despite these possible linkages, the airline economics literature contains
no comprehensive analysis of the eﬀect of noise regulation on airline service quality and fares.2
Because of this absence, no proper analysis of optimal noise regulations, which maximize social
welfare taking into account impacts on airlines and their passengers as well as noise victims,
has been possible. The purpose of this paper is to provide the missing analysis through the
use of a highly stylized, but suggestive, theoretical model.
The analysis draws on the scheduling model of Brueckner (2004), where higher ﬂight
frequency beneﬁts passengers by reducing “schedule delay” (allowing departures at more-
convenient times) while generating higher total noise. Noise per aircraft, denoted n,c a n
be reduced at a cost, which rises with aircraft size given that quieting a larger plane is more
expensive. The airline is viewed as choosing both n and aircraft size, along with ﬂight fre-
quency and fares, to maximize proﬁt subject to noise regulations. The manufacturer responds
to the resulting demand for aircraft quietness in its design decisions.
The analysis considers two diﬀerent regulatory regimes involving explicit noise constraints,
along with an alternative regime where airlines pay noise taxes. The ﬁrst type of noise con-
straint imposes a direct limit on noise per aircraft, with the constraint written as n ≤ n,w h e r e
n is the limit. Note that, under this constraint, n is removed as a choice variable for the airline.
The n limit is analogous to the FAA noise certiﬁcation standard, which governs quietness levels
for new aircraft while also requiring retroﬁtting of older, noisier planes.3
The second type of constraint is a cumulative noise limit at an airport, which is written
nf ≤ L,w h e r ef is ﬂight frequency (the number of ﬂights) and L is total allowed noise for
each airline. Note that an airline has ﬂexibility in meeting a cumulative limit because total
noise depends on both n and ﬂight frequency. This type of constraint, among other noise
2restrictions, is imposed by Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport (AMS), London’s Heathrow Airport
(LHR), and Long Beach Airport (LGB) in California.4 Even though cumulative noise limits
are not widespread currently, Figure 1 suggests that they are likely to become more common
as time passes, making an understanding of their eﬀects important.
Under noise taxation, explicit constraints are removed, but the airline instead pays a tax of
t per unit of noise, so that its total tax liability is tnf. Although noise taxes are not used much
in the U.S., they are more common elsewhere, being levied through landing-fee adjustments
that depend on an aircraft’s noise level. For institutional background, see Nero and Black
(2000) and Morell and Lu (2000).
In the analysis, the eﬀect of each of the three regulatory regimes is considered in isolation,
ignoring the fact that diﬀerent regimes often coexist in reality. This potentially unrealistic
approach is meant to gain insight into the economics of the regimes, and its practical lessons
are considered in the conclusion. Another unrealistic element is the linear fashion in which
noise is added across ﬂights under the cumulative limit. Under the actual regulations, noise
is added in a semi-logarithmic fashion, which makes total noise more sensitive to noise per
ﬂight than to the number of ﬂights.5 While incorporating this feature would complicate the
analysis, the main qualitative conclusions are likely to be unaﬀected.
The analysis solves the airline’s proﬁt-maximization problem under cumulative and per-
aircraft noise regulation and under the noise-tax regime. Comparative-static analysis shows
the eﬀects of parameter changes on the airline’s choice variables, results that are immediate
given that the model generates closed form solutions for all the variables. In addition, a key
equivance result between noise taxation and cumulative noise regulation is established.
While the cumulative or per-aircraft noise limits are treated as parameters in the
comparative-staticanalysis, the nextstep is to consider the social planner’s problem, whereL or
n is chosen optimally, taking into account the environmental damage from noise. Even though
the choice of a regulatory regime (cumulative vs. per-aircraft noise regulation) is immaterial
in characterizing the ﬁrst-best social optimum, the two regimes generate diﬀerent outcomes in
the second-best case, where the planner must accept the (ineﬃcient) proﬁt-maximizing choices
of the airline. An interesting question is then which regime yields a higher welfare level. This
3question cannot be addressed analytically, but it is investigated via numerical analysis. The
analysis also characterizes the noise tax rates that support the ﬁrst-best and second-best social
optima.
The entire analytical agenda described above can be carried out either under a monopoly
market structure, with a single airline, or in an oligopoly setting. Since the monopoly case
has already been analyzed by Girvin (2006a), the present paper analyzes an oligopoly model,
with the speciﬁc case of a duopoly considered. As seen below, the duopoly setup is actually a
special case of the monopoly model, and the results for this latter model are brieﬂysummarized.
The duopoly model is drawn from the analysis of Brueckner and Flores-Fillol (2006), and its
key element is idiosyncratic airline brand loyalty on the part of consumers, which governs
competition between the two duopoly carriers.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model. Section 3 introduces
the cumulative and per-aircraft noise constraints and solves the airline proﬁt-maximization
problem under these two diﬀerent regimes. Section 4 analyzes noise taxation, section 5 carries
out the welfare analysis, and section 6 oﬀers conclusions.
2. The Model
To start the analysis, it is useful to focus on airline costs. Following Brueckner (2004), the
cost of each ﬂight, exclusive of noise-abatement cost, is given by θ + τs,w h e r es equals seats
per ﬂight. Each ﬂight thus entails a ﬁxed cost θ as well as a variable cost τ per seat. While
this speciﬁcation may not be completely realistic, it captures the fact that an airline’s cost per
seat (given by θ/s+ τ) falls as aircraft size increases. Multiplying by ﬂight frequency yields a
total cost expression, f(θ + τs).
Noise-abatement cost per ﬂight, which is embodied in the aircraft design, is assumed to
depend on both aircraft size and quietness, being written g(s,n). The function g is increasing
in s, indicating that it costs more to achieve a given level of quietness for a larger aircraft. In
addition, g is decreasing in n, noise per aircraft, indicating that a quieter aircraft of a given
size generates higher costs, partly through lower fuel eﬃciency. Since noise abatement aﬀects
both the purchase price and operating cost of an aircraft, g should be viewed as giving the
4annualized abatement cost.
The function g is assumed to be homogeneous of degree zero, so that proportional increases
in aircraft size and noisiness leave abatement costs unchanged. A particular functional form
is then imposed for analytical tractability, with g(s,n) ≡  s/n,w h e r e >0 is the abatement-
cost parameter. This form embodies the above assumptions on g’s partial derivatives, and its
simplicity yields closed-form solutions for the variables of interest. With total noise abatement
cost equal to f s/n, the airline’s full cost is written
f(θ + τs)+ fs/n = θf +( τ +  /n)fs. (1)
Turning to the demand side of the model, the analysis focuses on a single city-pair market
servedby two airlines, although the extension to multiplemarketsis straightforward. Utilityfor
a consumer travelingbyair betweenthe citiesis givenby c+travel benefit−scheduledelay cost,
where c is consumption expenditure and schedule delay measures the diﬀerence between the ac-
tual and desired departure times. To represent schedule delay and its cost, suppose consumers
must commit to travel before knowing their preferred departures times, which are uniformly
distributed around a circle. Letting T denote the time circumference of the circle, consumer
utility from ﬂying on airline 1 then depends on expected schedule delay, which equals T/4f1,
where f1 is number of (evenly spaced) ﬂights operated by the airline (T/4f2 is the analogous
expression for airline 2). These expressions give the expected interval between the desired
departure time and the nearest ﬂight time. Schedule delay cost is then given by a disutility
parameter δ>0 times the above expressions, thus equaling δT/4fi ≡ γ/fi for airline i, i =1 ,2,
where γ = δT/4.
Travel beneﬁt has two components: b, equal to the gain from air travel, and a, an airline
brand-loyalty variable, which gives the additional gain from using airline 1 (relative to travel
on airline 2). Brand loyalty varies across consumers, with a uniformly distributed over the
interval [−α/2,α/2], where α>0, so that half the consumers prefer airline 1 and half prefer
airline 2.
For consumers using airline i, consumption expenditure equals y − pi,w h e r ey is income,
assumed to be uniform across consumers without loss of generality, and pi is airline i’s fare.
5Utility from travel on airline 1 is thus given by y − p1 + b + a − γ/f1, and utility from travel
on airline 2 is given by the analogous expression with a = 0. Assuming that the consumer
undertakes air travel, his choice is between the two airlines, and airline 1 will be chosen when
y − p1 + b + a − γ/f1 >y − p2 + b − γ/f2, (2)
or when
a>p 1 − p2 + γ/f1 − γ/f2. (3)
Thus, for the consumer to choose airline 1, brand loyalty to 1 must be at least as large as the
fare plus delay-cost diﬀerence between airlines 1 and 2. Otherwise, conditional on ﬂying, the
consumer will choose airline 2.
To compute airline 1’s traﬃc using (3), let the consumer population size be normalized to
unity. Then, recalling that a is uniformly distributed over the range [−α/2,α/2], airline 1’s














[p1 − p2 + γ/f1 − γ/f2], (5)
with q2 given by the analogous expression with the 1 and 2 subscripts interchanged. Note from
(5) that airline 1 loses traﬃc when its fare rises or its frequency falls, while it gains traﬃc when
p2 rises or f2 falls.6
The monopoly model, analyzed by Girvin (2006a), is generated by considering an “outside
option” not involving air travel, which could represent use of a diﬀerent transport mode or not
traveling at all. It yields beneﬁts e net of any fare paid or schedule delay incurred and thus a
utility level of y+e. The monopoly model emerges when a consumer who is indiﬀerent between
the airlines, with a = 0, prefers the outside option to air travel. Normalizing e to zero, this
6outcome requires y−p1 +b−γ/f1 <y ,o rb<p 1 +γ/f1,a n db<p 2 +γ/f2. While consumers
with a values near zero will not ﬂy when these equalities hold, stronger airline brand loyalty
can induce air travel. For example, a passenger loyal to airline 1 will ﬁnd air travel and the
outside option equally attractive when his loyalty value satisﬁes y − p1 + b + a − γ/f1 = y,o r
a = p1 + γ/f1 − b.7 Thus, consumers with a values larger than
 a = p1 + γ/f1 − b (6)











p1 + γ/f1 − b
α
. (7)
Since airline 2’s fare and frequency choices do not appear in (7), competition between the
carriers is not present, with airline 1 eﬀectively becoming a monopolist for passengers with
positive a values (airline 2 becomes a monopolist for negative-a passengers).
For the duopoly case to be relevant, b ≥ p + γ/f must hold at the p and f values that
emerge in a symmetric duopoly equilibrium. Otherwise, passengers with a values near zero
will prefer the outside option, making the monopoly case relevant instead. Accordingly, b
is assumed to be large enough to ensure satisfaction of the above inequality, with the exact
lower bound discussed below.9 Results for the monopoly case, which are presented by Girvin
(2006a), are summarized once the duopoly analysis is complete.10
It should be noted that, while a monopoly airline’s equilibrium traﬃc level depends on its
fare and frequency, as can be seen from (7), each duopoly airline carries an equilibrium traﬃc
level of 1/2 in a symmetric equilibrium regardless of its choices. From (5), q1 =1 /2h o l d sw h e n
fares and frequencies are the same across carriers. In reaching the equilibrium, however, each
carrier takes into account traﬃc gains and losses to the other carrier as it adjusts its choice
variables, as seen below. But since no consumer is assumed to choose the outside option,
the carriers battle for a ﬁxed amount of total traﬃc, which is split evenly between them in
equilibrium. This feature of the model accounts the simplicity of the ensuing analysis and the
7emergence of clear-cut comparative-static eﬀects, which are mostly absent in the monopoly
case.
With the traﬃc solution in (5) relevant for the duopoly case, it can be combined with the
previous cost expression in (1) to yield proﬁt. Multiplying (5) by p1 and subtracting (1) (with
subscripts added), airline 1’s proﬁt is equal to
π1 = p1q1 − θf1 − (τ +  /n1)f1s1
= p1q1 − θf1 − (τ +  /n1)q1







[p1 − p2 + γ/f1 − γ/f2]

− θf1, (8)
Note that (8) uses the equality f1s1 = q1, which says that the number of ﬂights times seats per
ﬂight equals total traﬃc. Using (8), the subsequent analysis considers the proﬁt-maximization
problem under the two diﬀerent regulatory regimes.
3. Airline Choices Under Noise Constraints
3.1. The case of a cumulative constraint
Suppose that noise regulation takes the form of a cumulative noise constraint, which im-
poses a common limit on the total noise generated by each airline, being written nifi ≤ L,
i =1 ,2. Since this constraint will bind in equilibrium, it can be used to eliminate n1,w h i c h
can be written n1 = L/f1. Substituting in (8), the multiplicative p1 − τ −  /n1 term becomes
p1 − τ −  f1/L. The resulting objective function then depends only on the choice variables p1
and f1.
In modeling airline decisions, an important question concerns the timing of choices. While
both ﬂight frequencies and fares can be adjusted relatively easily, fares appear to be more
ﬂexible than frequencies. As a result, under the most realistic approach, fares would be chosen
conditional on frequencies, which themselves would be set in a ﬁrst stage, taking the second-
stage impact on fares into account (the outcome is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium).
The analysis eventually adopts this approach, but it is useful to start by considering the less-
8realistic case where fares and frequenciesare chosen simultaneously in Nash fashion. Under this
approach, airline 1 simultaneously sets the levels of p1 and f1,t a k i n gp2 and f2 as parametric.
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[p1 − p2 + γ/f1 − γ/f2]

+
γ(p1 − τ −  f1/L)
αf2
1
− θ =0 . (10)
While the derivatives ∂2π1/∂p2
1 and ∂2π1/∂f2
1 are easily seen to be negative, the remaining
second-order condition (positivity of the Hessian matrix of π1) is assumed to hold.11
Given the symmetry of the setup, the equilibrium fares and frequencies will be symmetric
across carriers, with the values denoted p and f, and each airline’s traﬃc will equal 1/2.
Imposing the latter condition in (9) and rearranging, the fare can be written
p = α/2+τ +  f/L. (11)
Thus, the fare equals the full marginal cost of a seat, given by the operating cost τ plus noise
abatement cost per seat ( f/L),12 plus a markup that depends on brand loyalty. Note that,
as the extent of brand loyalty rises, leading to a higher α/2, a carrier loses less traﬃc from
raising its fare, so that p increases.
After substituting (11) into (10) and imposing symmetry, the equation can be solved for




2θ +  /L
. (12)
This solution shows that frequency is increasing in the disutility of schedule delay (γ)a n d
decreasing in the ﬁxed cost per ﬂight (θ), both natural conclusions. Since the fare in (11)
increases with frequency, p is then increasing in γ and decreasing in θ. Note that the last
9conclusion, which says that p is inversely related to the ﬁxed cost per ﬂight, is counterintu-
itive. The explanation is that the reduction in service quality caused by the higher θ reduces
willingness to pay for air travel. Observe also that f is independent of the marginal seat cost
(τ) and the extent of brand loyalty (α).13
The key comparative-static question, however, concerns the eﬀect of the noise limit L on
the airline’s choice variables. When the noise constraint is relaxed by increasing L, (12) shows
that frequency rises, with the denominator expression becoming smaller. This conclusion is
natural since, as L rises, the airline can raise f for a given n without violating the constraint.
With L and   appearing in ratio form in (12), the opposite conclusion applies to an increase
in  : by raising the cost per ﬂight, a higher noise-abatement cost lowers frequency.
T u r n i n gt ot h ei m p a c to fL on p, the eﬀect is not immediately apparent given that p has an
direct inversedependence on L from (11) as well as an indirectdependence via f. However, after
substituting (12) into (11) and rearranging, the last term reduces to

γ 2/(2θL2 +  L), which
is decreasing in L. Therefore, relaxation of the noise constraint leads to a lower equilibrium
fare, a conclusion that shows how the cost of airline travel is aﬀected along with service quality
(f) by the stringency of noise regulation. Since L and   enter asymmetrically in the previous
expression, their impacts are no longer mirror images. But it is easily seen that the expression
is increasing in  , so that the fare naturally rises with the cost of abatement.
Aircraft quietness and size, n and s, can be recovered from the f solution, allowing further
comparative-static eﬀects to be derived. Since s = q/f =1 /2f, the parameter impacts on




2θL2 +  L
γ
, (13)
so that n is increasing in L and  , both natural conclusions. Thus, aircraft quietness falls (n
rises) as the noise constraint is relaxed or the cost of abatement increases. In addition, (13)
shows that a higher ﬁxed cost per ﬂight raises n, while an increase in the delay disutility has
the opposite eﬀect. All of these comparative-static results are summarized in Table 1.
These results show that tighter noise regulation under a cumulative constraint hurts airline
10passengers, with the impact operating through two channels. Flight frequency falls, reducing
service quality, and fares rise, so that the cost of travel escalates as it convenience declines.
For tighter regulation to be desirable, these losses must be oﬀset by social gains from a lower
noise level, as analyzed below.14
3.2. Sequential choice under a cumulative constraint
Using the simultaneous-choice case as a benchmark, consider now the case where frequen-
cies and fares are chosen sequentially. Under sequential choice, fares are set conditional on
frequencies, with frequencies then chosen in a ﬁrst stage, taking into account the second-stage
impact on fares.
To analyze this case, the ﬁrst-order condition for choice of p1 (eq. (9)) is supplemented
with the analogous condition for airline 2, gotten by reversing the 1 and 2 subscripts in (9).
The equations are then solved for p1 and p2 as functions of f1 and f2.T h es o l u t i o nf o rp1 is
given by














and the p2 solution is gotten by reversingthe 1 and 2 subscripts. These solutions are substituted
into the proﬁt function (8) for airline 1, which is diﬀerentiated with respect to f1 treating f2 as
parametric. Symmetry is imposed in the resulting ﬁrst-order condition, which is then solved




3θ +  /L
, (15)
which diﬀers from (12) by the presence of the factor 3, rather than 2, in the denominator.
Thus, for a given L, frequency is smaller in the sequential-choice case. The p solution in (11),
which remains relevant, shows that the smaller f leads to a lower fare under sequential choice.
In addition, the lower f leads to a smaller aircraft size, and aircraft are also noisier under
sequential choice (the 2 factor in (13) is replaced by 3).
Despite these diﬀerences, the timing of airline decisions has no eﬀect on the main
comparative-static properties of the equilibrium. In particular, it is easy to see that the change
in the f solution leaves the signs in Table 1 unaﬀected, so that the table applies to both the
11sequential and simultaneous-choice cases.16
The key conclusions of the preceding analysis are then summarized as follows:
Proposition 1. A reduction in the allowed noise level under a cumulative noise
constraint leads to lower ﬂight frequency, larger and quieter aircraft, and a higher fare,
regardless of whether airline choices are simultaneous or sequential. Airline passengers
are hurt by the tighter noise limit.
3.3. The case of a per-aircraft noise constraint
Suppose now that noise regulation takes the form of a per-aircraft noise constraint, written
as ni ≤ n, i =1 ,2. Since the constraint will bind, airline 1’s objective function is given by (8)
with n1 replaced by n. Under simultaneous choice, the previous ﬁrst-order condition (9) for p1
remains relevant, but with L replaced by f1n. Imposing symmetry, the fare solution is then
p = α/2+τ +  /n, (16)
which corresponds to the previous solution in (11) after substitution for L. This equivalence
implies that, if L under the cumulative constraint is set so that noise per aircraft in (13) is
equal to n, the same fare levels emerge under the two regimes.




γ(p1 − τ −  /n)
αf2
1
− θ =0 , (17)






Under sequential choice, which is analyzed by following the same steps as before, the fare






12where a factor of 3 replaces the 2 in the simultaneous solution, as in the cumulative case.17
Under both the simultaneous and sequential solutions, frequency is increasing in γ and
decreasing in θ, as in the cumulative case. But frequency does not depend on n and is thus
independent of the stringency of the noise constraint, in contrast to the cumulative case. With
f independent of the noise limit, nf and thus total noise L rises as n is raised, and L rises
with γ and falls with θ, holding n ﬁxed. In addition, since the fare solution in (16) does not
involve f, p is now independent of γ and θ, although the fare responds positively to α and
τ, as before. These comparative-static eﬀects are summarized in Table 2. Airline passengers
are hurt, as in the cumulative case, by a tighter noise constraint, but the eﬀect now operates
through a single channel, a higher fare, with service quality unchanged.18
As in the cumulative case, sequential choice yields a higher frequency and smaller aircraft
size than simultaneous choice. But since p is independent of f, fare levels are the same under
the two choice scenarios, in contrast to the previous conclusion.
A more interesting observation, however, is that frequency is always higher under a per-
aircraft noise constraint than in the cumulative case, with the opposite conclusion applying to
aircraft size. These results follow because the simultaneous frequency solution in (18) is larger
than the corresponding cumulative solution (12), with the same comparison applying to the
sequential solutions (19) and (15). Apparently, lower frequencies arise in the cumulative case
because a reduction in f provides a means of satisfying the cumulative constraint.
Summarizing the main conclusions of the above analysis yields
Proposition 2. (i) A reduction in the allowed noise level under a per-aircraft con-
straint raises the fare, harming airline passengers, while having no eﬀect on ﬂight
frequency or aircraft size. Total noise falls.
(ii) Flight frequency is always higher and aircraft size lower under a per-aircraft noise
constraint than under a cumulative constraint, but fares are identical in the two cases
when the constraints are set to achieve the same noise per aircraft.
3.4. The monopoly case
In the monopoly case, analyzed by Girvin (2006a), diﬀerent comparative-static results
emerge. Although closed-form solutions for the decision variables are not available, her analysis
13shows that a tightening of the cumulative noise constraint reduces ﬂight frequency, as in
Proposition 1. A lower L also aﬀects traﬃc q, which no longer assumes the constant equilibrium
value of 1/2, causing it to drop. With f and q both falling, the change in aircraft size is
ambiguous, and the same conclusion applies to aircraft quietness and the fare. Under a per-
aircraft noise constraint, a reduction in n lowers f, in contrast to Proposition 2, while also
reducing traﬃc. In addition, aircraft size falls. These conclusions show that the duopoly and
monopoly equilibria have very diﬀerent properties.
4. Noise Taxation
4.1. The equivalence of noise taxation and cumulative regulation
Under noise taxation, the airlines pay a tax of t per unit of noise.19 As a result, the
additional term tf1n1 is subtracted in the proﬁt expression (8), which becomes







[p1 − p2 + γ/f1 − γ/f2]

− θf1 − tf1n1. (20)
With simultaneous choice, this expression is maximized by choice of p1, f1,a n dn1 without the
presence of any constraint. The ﬁrst-order condition for p1 reduces to the previous condition










These conditions determine the symmetric equilibrium values of f and n conditional on t.
To compare the outcome to the other regimes, it is useful to change variables so that (21) and
(22) are expressed in terms of f and L,w h e r eL is endogenous. Using (21) along with nf = L




2θ +  /L
, (23)
14which is the same as the cumulative frequency solution (12) under simultaneous choice. In
addition, since (21) can be rewritten as (nf )2/f =  /2t, the condition becomes
−
 f
L2 +2 t =0 . (24)
Substituting (23) into (24) and simplifying yields the following condition that determines L as
a function of t:

γ 
8θL4/  +4 L3 = t. (25)
To obtain the entire solution under noise taxation for a given t, (25) is solved for the corre-
sponding L, and substitution in (23) then yields f and consequently n. The fare solution in
(16) then yields p.
Because (23) is the same as the cumulative frequency solution, a key implication of (23)
and (25) is that noise taxation is equivalent to cumulative noise regulation. In other words, the
outcome generated by a particular cumulative noise limit L# can be exactly replicated under
noise taxation. To do so, L# is plugged into (25), and t is set at the resulting value, denoted
t#. When the airlines maximize facing t#, a total noise level of L# per carrier is generated
endogenously, and the f, n and p values corresponding to the cumulative limit then emerge.
The same conclusion emerges under sequential choice. Fares are again chosen in a second
stage, while airline 1 chooses f1 and n1 in the ﬁrst stage taking the second-stage fare impacts
into account and viewing f2 and n2 as parametric. Given this behavior, a lengthy derivation
yields symmetric ﬁrst-order conditions with the same form as (21) and (22). The diﬀerence
is that a factor of 3 replaces the 2 in each instance in these equations.20 As a result, 3
replaces 2 in (23) and (24), and 18 replaces 8 in (25). Since the modiﬁed (23) is then the
same as the sequential solution in (15), the same argument as before establishes that noise
taxation is equivalent to cumulative noise regulation under sequential choice. In other words,
the cumulative outcome for a given L = L# can be exactly replicated under noise taxation by
a suitable choice of t. Summarizing yields21
Proposition 3. Noise taxation and cumulative noise regulation are equivalent, re-
gardless of whether airline choices are simultaneous or sequential. In particular, the
15outcome under cumulative regulation can be exactly replicated by suitable choice of the
noise tax t.
The apparent explanation for this result is that both the tax and cumulative regimes
give the airline the same margins of adjustment (f and n), even though these variables must
satisfy a constraint in the cumulative case. In the per-aircraft regime, by contrast, the airline’s
adjustment margins are limited.
4.2. Comparative statics under noise taxation
Inspection of (25) shows how parameter changes aﬀect L. First, since the LHS is decreasing
in L, if follows that a higher t reduces total noise per carrier, a natural result. In addition, it
is easily seen that L is decreasing in θ and increasing in both γ and  , while being independent
of α and τ. Taking account of the eﬀects on L, inspection of (23) shows that f is decreasing
in t and θ and increasing in γ, while an additional argument shows that f decreases with  .
Since n =  /2Lt from (21), eliminating t using (25) yields n =

(2θL2 +  L)/γ.U s i n g t h e
impacts on L, it follows from the latter solution that n is decreasing in t and increasing in  .
Again using impacts on L, the ﬁrst solution shows that n is decreasing in γ and increasing
in θ. Finally, using (16) with n in place of n, inspection shows that p is increasing in t and
decreasing in γ and θ, and an additional argument shows that p increases with  .22
These results are summarized in Table 3. Note that the comparative-static eﬀects of  , τ,
α, γ,a n dθ are naturally the same as in the cumulative case (compare the last ﬁve columns
of Tables 1 and 3). Finally, observe that since f falls and p rises with t, an increase in the
noise tax hurts airline passengers. These results, which also apply to the sequential case, are
summarized as follows
Proposition 4. An increase in the noise tax leads to less total noise, lower ﬂight
frequency, larger and quieter aircraft, and a higher fare, regardless of whether airline
choices are simultaneous or sequential. Airline passengers are hurt by the higher noise
tax.
165. Welfare Analysis
This section of the paper carries out welfare analysis.23 Social welfare in the model is equal
to consumer surplus plus airline proﬁt minus environmental noise damage. Since the fare paid
is just a transfer between consumers and the airlines, while the beneﬁts from travel and brand
loyalty are constants, the planner can focus on a welfare measure equal to airline costs plus
the cost of consumer schedule delay plus noise damage. Imposing symmetry on the airlines,
and writing welfare in terms of L, the welfare expression equals







where noise damage is assumed for simplicity to be a linear function of total noise (equal to
2L), with parameter λ.24 To interpret the rest of (26), recall that total traﬃc is equal to unity,
which then multiplies the marginal seat cost τ and schedule delay cost, γ/f. With two airlines,
ﬁxed cost acquires a factor of 2, and total noise abatement cost is 2f( s/n)= /n =  f/L,
where the ﬁrst equality uses the fact that 2fs equals the total unitary traﬃc level. The
planner’s goal is to minimize (26) by choice of f and L. Equivalently, (26) could be rewritten
in terms of n, which would be chosen optimally along with f.25
Note that, because the fare cancels in computing W, the impacts of noise regulation on
passengers that operate through p are irrelevant in the welfare analysis. Only those eﬀects
operating through schedule-delay costs matter.
5.1. The ﬁrst-best optimum and the second-best optimum under a cumulative constraint
Viewing L as the choice variable, it is useful to derive the social optimum in two steps.






f2 =0 , (27)




2θ +  /L
, (28)
17where f∗(L) denotes the optimal frequency conditional on L. Next, (28) is substituted back




L2 +2 λ =0 , (29)
which says that the extra noise damage should equal the saving in abatement cost when L is
marginally increased. After substituting (28) into (29) and simplifying, the socially optimal
noise level, denoted L∗ and referred to as the ﬁrst-best optimal value, turns out to be the root
of a 4th degree polynomial in L. The ﬁrst-best optimal f then equals f∗(L∗), and the optimal
n is given by n∗ = L∗/f∗(L∗).
The conditionally optimal f solution in (28) reveals the eﬃciency of airline choices under
a cumulative constraint, for a given value of L. Since (28) and (12) are the same, it follows
that for a given L, the airline’s frequency choice is eﬃcient, provided that its choices are made
in simultaneous fashion. However, if choice is sequential, then the airline’s chosen frequency
is lower than the one desired by the planner, as seen by comparing (15) and (28), and aircraft
size is correspondingly too large.
With the airline’s choices eﬃcient under simultaneous choice, it follows that the planner
could set L at L∗, allow the airline to maximize proﬁt, and be assured that the outcome would
be socially optimal. However, under more-realistic sequential behavior, the airline makes the
wrong choices conditional on L, which means that setting L at L∗ would fail to generate the
social optimum. Thus, in the sequential case, the planner must take the airline’s distorted
choices into account in setting L, which leads to the second-best optimal level under sequential
choice, denoted ˆ L.
To characterize ˆ L,l e tˆ f(L) denote the airline’s proﬁt-maximizing sequential frequency
choice conditional on L, given by (15). With the planner obliged to accept airline choices, his
objective function comes from substituting ˆ f(L) into (26), which yields

















ˆ f (L)+2 λ =0 . (31)
Since the term in parentheses in (31) reduces to θ using (15), the condition can be written
−
 ˆ f(L)
L2 − θˆ f (L)+2 λ =0 . (32)
Substituting ˆ f(L) and simplifying, (32) reduces to a 6th degree polynomial equation in L,
which determines ˆ L, the second-best optimal value.
An interesting question is whether ˆ L is larger or smaller than the ﬁrst-best optimal value
L∗. In other words, when the planner must accept the airline’s ineﬃcient choices, does he set a
cumulative noise limit looser or tighter than the ﬁrst-best level? To answer this question, (32)
must be compared to the ﬁrst-best condition in (29). As functions of L, both LHS expressions
must be upward-sloping curves at the respective optima to ensure minimization of W,w h i c h
means that the higher curve is associated with the smaller L solution. On the one hand, the
presence of the term −θˆ f (L), which is negative by Proposition 1, tends to make the second-
best curve from (32) lower than the ﬁrst-best curve, which in turn tends to make ˆ L larger
than the L∗. The intuitive explanation comes from recalling that the conditional sequential
frequency solution is ineﬃciently low, with ˆ f(L) <f ∗(L). Given ˆ f (L) > 0, it follows that
the planner can use his second-best L choice to raise f from its ineﬃciently low level, an
intervention that would require setting L above its ﬁrst-best value. On the other hand, the
fact that ˆ f(L) <f ∗(L) makes the initial term in the second-best expression from (32) larger
(less negative) than the corresponding term in the above ﬁrst-best expression, which tends to
make the second-best curve higher than the ﬁrst-best curve.
Despite this apparent indeterminacy, once the f∗ and ˆ f functions are substituted into (29)
and (32) and appropriate manipulations are made, it can be shown that ˆ L<L ∗ holds (see
the appendix). This conclusion means that the latter eﬀect discussed above (which depresses
ˆ L) dominates the goal of using ˆ L to boost the airlines’ ineﬃciently low ﬂight frequency. With
19ˆ L<L ∗, it follows from (15) and (28) that ˆ f(ˆ L) <f ∗(L∗), so that the second-best ﬂight
frequency under sequential choice is ineﬃciently low. In addition, using ˆ L<L ∗,i tc a nb e
shown that n∗ < ˆ n = ˆ L/ˆ f(ˆ L), where ˆ n is the second-best optimal n value (see the appendix).
Summarizing yields26
Proposition 5. The second-best cumulative noise limit under sequential choice is
less than the ﬁrst-best limit (ˆ L<L ∗). In addition, the associated second-best ﬂight
frequency is lower than the ﬁrst-best level, and the second-best per-aircraft noise level
is higher than the ﬁrst-best level.
5.2. What noise-tax levels support the optima?
Since noise taxation and cumulative noise regulation are equivalent, it follows that the
above optima can be generated by suitable selection of the noise tax t. C o n s i d e rﬁ r s tt h e
case where airlines make simultaneous choices. As seen above, when L is set at L∗ under
cumulative regulation, airline decisions yield the ﬁrst-best optimum. But since any outcome
under cumulative regulation can be generated by an appropriate noise tax, it follows that a
particular value of the tax yields the ﬁrst-best optimum.
To derive that value, observe that (23) and (24) jointly determine the solutions for f and L
under a particular level of the noise tax t. But this equation system has the same form as (28)
and (29), which determine the ﬁrst-best optimum. The two systems can be made identical,
ensuring that the noise-tax solution coincides with the social optimum, when t is set at the
appropriate value, denoted t∗. As can be seen, the correct value is t∗ = λ, indicating that the
noise tax should be set equal to the marginal noise damage, a natural conclusion.
Suppose instead that airline choices are sequential, so that the second-best optimum is
relevant. To ﬁnd the noise tax that generates this optimum, recall that the solution under noise
taxation is given by (15) along with the modiﬁed version of (24), which is written − f/L2+3t =
0. Thus, the equation determining L under noise taxation can be written − ˆ f(L)/L2+3t =0 .
For the resulting solution to coincide with the second-best optimum, t must be set at the value
ˆ t satisfying
−
 ˆ f(ˆ L)
ˆ L2 +3 ˆ t =0 . (33)
20But since (32) must hold at L = ˆ L, (33) can be used to eliminate the ﬁrst term, allowing the
equation to be rewritten as








θˆ f (ˆ L) <λ≡ t∗. (35)
(note that (32) implies positivity of ˆ t). Thus, the noise tax rate that generates the second-best
optimum under cumulative regulation is less than the marginal noise damage and thus less
than t∗. Note that this conclusion might seem inconsistent with the inequality ˆ L<L ∗ from
Proposition 5 given that a low tax should be associated with a large, not a small, L. But since
this inverse relationship holds airline choice behavior ﬁxed, whileˆ t and t∗ apply under diﬀerent
behaviors (simultaneous vs. sequential choice), no inconsistency arises.
It is important to recognize that, since noise taxation and cumulative noise regulation are
equivalent under sequential choice, and since ˆ L is the best possible value of L,at a xr a t e
diﬀerent from ˆ t (one associated with a diﬀerent value of L) cannot yield a higher welfare level.
Thus, ˆ t is the welfare maximizing noise tax rate under sequential choice, and it is less than the
marginal noise damage λ. Summarizing yields
Proposition 6. If airline choices are simultaneous, the ﬁrst-best optimum can be
generated by a noise tax equal to the marginal noise damage λ. If airline choices are
instead sequential, the welfare maximizing tax rate is less than λ, and it generates the
second-best optimum under cumulative regulation.
5.3. Could per-aircraft noise regulation be superior?
When airline choices are simultaneous, per-aircraft regulation can never be superior to
cumulative regulation (or equivalent noise taxation) since these regimes can generate the ﬁrst-
best optimum. Per-aircraft regulation is, by contrast, ineﬃcient given that the simultaneous
frequency solution in (18) is always larger than the ﬁrst-best optimal level, f∗(L∗). But when
choices are sequential, this conclusion can be overturned. To understand this claim, consider









3θ +  /ˆ L
≡ ˆ f(ˆ L) <f ∗(L∗) (36)
Thus, ˜ f is larger than ˆ f(ˆ L), the second-best optimal frequency under cumulative regulation,
which in turn is smaller than the ﬁrst-best optimal frequency f∗(L∗) by Proposition 5. Given
(36), ˜ f could be closer to f∗(L∗)t h a ni sˆ f(ˆ L), raising the possibility that per-aircraft regulation
is superior to cumulative regulation.
Since welfare under the per-aircraft regime also depends on the magnitude of n,e x p l o r i n g
this question requires computation of the second-best n under sequential choice. To do so,
the welfare expression in (26) is rewritten in terms of n and ˜ f is then substituted, so that the
last four terms become 2θ˜ f +  /n + γ/˜ f + λ2n˜ f. The second-best optimal per-aircraft noise
limit is found by diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to n,n o t i n gt h a t˜ f from (36) is
independent of n. The resulting ﬁrst-order condition is
−
 
n2 +2 λ˜ f =0 . (37)
After using (36) to substitute for ˜ f, (37) can be solved for n and the result substituted into
the above welfare expression. If per-aircraft regulation is superior, the resulting welfare level
is higher than the one achieved under cumulative regulation.
This comparison cannot be carried out analytically, but illustrative numerical examples
can be computed. In generating the examples, the marginal-cost parameter τ is normalized
to one, while four other parameters are allowed to vary.27 The delay-disutility and ﬁxed-cost
parameters γ and θ vary between 0.1 and 10.1 in steps of 1, while three combinations of
the abatement-cost and noise damage parameters are considered: ( ,λ)=( 1 ,1),(10,1), and
(10,10). Since the model is highly stylized, realistic calibration is not possible, making these
parameter choices arbitrary. For each parameter combination, the polynomial equations for
the various optima have only one positive solution, and the curves are upward sloping at the
solution values, ensuring that these values represent minima for W.
22The welfare comparison between the two regulatory regimes, given as ratios of the cumu-
lative and per-aircraft welfare levels, is shown in Table 4. The results show that welfare under
the per-aircraft regime tends to be larger than under the cumulative regime when γ and θ
are big and smaller otherwise, with the margin of reversal shifting outward as   and λ assume
larger values. Note that in the third panel of Table 4, welfare is higher under the cumulative
regime for all the values of γ and θ. Summarizing yields
Proposition 7. When airline choices are sequential, the second-best welfare level may
be higher under per-aircraft noise regulation than under cumulative regulation or the
equivalent tax regime.
Despite this conclusion, further inspection of Table 4 reveals that the choice between the
two regulatory regimes is actually a matter of indiﬀerence for most parameter values, with the
ratios usually very close to 1. However, when γ and θ are both small, the per-aircraft regime
becomes markedly inferior to the cumulative regime. With the regimes otherwise close to
equivalent, this ﬁnding suggests that cumulative noise regulation (or equivalent noise taxation)
may be preferable to per-aircraft regulation. Of course, this conclusion might be overturned
by results from other unexplored regions of the parameter space.
A further numerical observation concerns the magnitude of the welfare sacriﬁce from the
planner’s inability to implement the ﬁrst-best optimum. Interestingly, this sacriﬁce is very
small: second-best welfare under the cumulative regime is never smaller than 98 percent of the
ﬁrst-best level, and the per-aircraft regime yields a similarly good outcome over most of the
parameter region. But for those parameter values where the per-aircraft regime falls well short
of the cumulative regime, the loss it generates relative to the ﬁrst-best optimum is similarly
large.28
6. Conclusion
This paper has explored the impact of airport noise regulation on airline service quality
and airfares. It has also characterized the socially optimal stringency of noise limits, taking
both noise damage and the various costs borne by airlines and their passengers into account,
while analyzing the use of noise taxes. Along with the companion paper by Girvin (2006a), this
23work represents the ﬁrst complete theoretical investigation into the economics of airport noise
regulation using a model where the interests of the key relevant stakeholders are captured.
The main conclusions of the analysis are as follows: (i) noise regulation harms airline pas-
sengers by raising fares and potentially reducing servicequality; (ii)cumulativeand per-aircraft
noise regulation have quite diﬀerent eﬀects on airline decisions; (iii) cumulative regulation ap-
pears to be superior from a social-welfare perspective; (iv) under realistic sequential airline
choice behavior, the best a planner can do under cumulative regulation is to use an ineﬃ-
ciently tight noise limit that yields lower-than-optimal ﬂight frequency; (iv) noise taxation is
equivalent to cumulative noise regulation, generating exactly the same airline decisions when
the tax rate is suitably chosen.
The analysis has treated noise taxes and the two noise-regulation regimes, cumulative and
per-aircraft, as alternatives, when in fact these approaches often coexist in actual practice. In
other words, the FAA certiﬁcation standard puts an upper bound on noise per aircraft, while
individual airports impose cumulative noise limits and other operating constraints, including
noise taxes. Given this real-world complexity, what practical lessons can be drawn from the
analysis? To reach an answer, the ﬁrst observation is that most aircraft currently in production
already have lower noise signatures than the latest Stage 4 noise limits.29 This fact, along with
the presence of additional airport-level regulations, apparently means that airports do not
ﬁnd the existing per-aircraft noise limits to be suﬃciently stringent. Therefore, they impose
additional regulations, which generate a demand for aircraft quieter than the current FAA
standard.
Instead of allowing aircraft quietness to be eﬀectively determined by airport-level policies,
the FAA could instead impose a per-aircraft limit that is even more stringent than the Stage
4 limit. But since a cumulative noise limit (or the equivalent tax) appears to be a superior
instrument, the analysis suggests that airport-level regulation may actually be a preferable
policy.
Although the highly stylized framework presented in this paper captures the essential
elements of the airport noise problem, additional reﬁnements and extensions of the model
could be beneﬁcial. For example, more-realistic speciﬁcations of the airline’s noise-abatement
24cost function and the functions giving cumulative noise and noise damage would improve the
model’s accuracy. Moreover, adding the airport itself to the list of stakeholders in the model
could provide further insights. The airport, responding to political pressure to reduce noise,
could be portrayed as choosing the noise regulatory regime that maximizes its proﬁt for a
given target noise level. In other extensions, concurrent implementation of noise-abatement
measures, such as a nighttime curfew and a noise tax, could be modeled, and airline asymmetry
(with one large and one small carrier) could be introduced. Analysis of these extended models
might, in some cases, require numerical methods. But the insights gained from numerical
models, especially those that can be calibrated with empirical data, might prove valuable in
guiding airport noise policies.
25Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5:
Combining (29) and (32), L∗ and ˆ L must satisfy
 ˆ f(ˆ L)
ˆ L2 + θˆ f (ˆ L)=
 f∗(L∗)
L∗2 (a1)





3θ +  /ˆ L
+
θ 
2ˆ L2(3θ +  /ˆ L)

γ






2θ +  /L∗ (a2)
Rearranging and squaring both sides, (a2) reduces to
2θL∗ +  
3θˆ L +  


7θˆ L +2  









Suppose that ˆ L ≥ L∗ holds. Then the LHS of (a3) must exceed 1. But after rearranging, the
resulting inequality reduces to
L∗ ≥ ˆ L


108θ3ˆ L2 +5 9 θ2 ˆ L +8 θ 2
98θ3ˆ L2 +5 6 θ2 ˆ L +8 θ 2

. (a4)
Since the ratio term in (a4) exceeds 1, the inequality implies L∗ > ˆ L, which contradicts the
initial assumption that ˆ L ≥ L∗, implying that ˆ L<L ∗ must hold instead.
To establish n∗ < ˆ n,n o t et h a t( a1) can be rewritten as
 
ˆ nˆ L
+ θˆ f (ˆ L)=
 
n∗L∗, (a5)









Figure 1.  Trends in Airport Noise Restrictions 
 
(Source:  http://www.boeing.com/commercial/noise/airports2005.pdf) Table 1.
Comparative-Static Eﬀects Under a Cumulative Constraint
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Table 2.
Comparative-Static Eﬀects Under a Per-Aircraft Constraint
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Table 3.
Comparative-Static Eﬀects Under Noise Taxation
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27Table 4.  
Ratio of Second-Best Welfare under Cumulative Noise Limit to Welfare under Per-Aircraft Noise Limit 
( ε = 1, λ = 1) 
   θ                        
γ  0.1 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 9.1 10.1 
0.1  1.3634 1.0276 1.0028 0.9954 0.9924 0.9911 0.9905  0.9903 0.9903 0.9904 0.9905
1.1  1.1983  0.9994 0.9915 0.9903 0.9904 0.9908 0.9912  0.9917 0.9921 0.9925 0.9928
2.1  1.1638  0.9957 0.9906 0.9903 0.9908 0.9913 0.9919  0.9924 0.9928 0.9932 0.9936
3.1  1.1449  0.9940 0.9904 0.9905 0.9911 0.9917 0.9923  0.9928 0.9933 0.9936 0.9940
4.1  1.1322  0.9930 0.9903 0.9907 0.9914 0.9920 0.9926  0.9931 0.9936 0.9939 0.9943
5.1  1.1228  0.9924 0.9903 0.9908 0.9916 0.9923 0.9929  0.9934 0.9938 0.9942 0.9945
6.1  1.1154  0.9920 0.9903 0.9910 0.9918 0.9925 0.9931  0.9936 0.9940 0.9944 0.9947
7.1  1.1093  0.9917 0.9903 0.9911 0.9919 0.9926 0.9932  0.9937 0.9942 0.9945 0.9948
8.1  1.1042  0.9914 0.9904 0.9912 0.9921 0.9928 0.9934  0.9939 0.9943 0.9947 0.9950
9.1  1.0999  0.9912 0.9904 0.9913 0.9922 0.9929 0.9935  0.9940 0.9944 0.9948 0.9951
10.1  1.0960  0.9910 0.9905 0.9914 0.9923 0.9930 0.9936  0.9941 0.9945 0.9949 0.9952
 
                            R a t i o   <   1  
( ε = 10, λ = 1)  
   θ                         
γ  0.1 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 9.1  10.1 
0.1  1.8666 1.1877 1.0992 1.0615 1.0407 1.0277 1.0189 1.0127 1.0081 1.0046 1.0020
1.1  1.5717 1.0831 1.0326 1.0138 1.0046 0.9994 0.9962  0.9942 0.9928 0.9919 0.9913
2.1  1.5047 1.0633 1.0213 1.0064 0.9994 0.9957 0.9935  0.9922 0.9913 0.9908 0.9905
3.1  1.4668 1.0528 1.0156 1.0029 0.9970 0.9940 0.9923  0.9914 0.9908 0.9905 0.9903
4.1  1.4407 1.0460 1.0120 1.0006 0.9956 0.9931 0.9917  0.9909 0.9905 0.9903 0.9903
5.1  1.4209 1.0410 1.0094 0.9991 0.9946 0.9924 0.9913  0.9907 0.9904 0.9903 0.9903
6.1  1.4051 1.0372 1.0075 0.9980 0.9939 0.9920 0.9910  0.9905 0.9903 0.9903 0.9903
7.1  1.3920 1.0341 1.0059 0.9971 0.9934 0.9917 0.9908  0.9904 0.9903 0.9903 0.9904
8.1  1.3808 1.0315 1.0047 0.9964 0.9930 0.9914 0.9907  0.9904 0.9903 0.9903 0.9904
9.1  1.3711 1.0293 1.0036 0.9958 0.9926 0.9912 0.9906  0.9903 0.9903 0.9904 0.9905
10.1  1.3626 1.0275 1.0027 0.9953 0.9924 0.9911 0.9905  0.9903 0.9903 0.9904 0.9906
 
 ( ε = 10, λ = 10)  
   θ                        
γ  0.1 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 9.1 10.1 
0.1  2.6722 1.5514 1.3697 1.2807 1.2258 1.1879 1.1599 1.1383 1.1211 1.1070 1.0953
1.1  2.2096 1.3330 1.2027 1.1423 1.1068 1.0832 1.0665 1.0540 1.0444 1.0367 1.0306
2.1  2.1014 1.2852 1.1677 1.1144 1.0835 1.0634 1.0492 1.0388 1.0309 1.0246 1.0196
3.1  2.0394 1.2585 1.1485 1.0993 1.0711 1.0529 1.0402 1.0310 1.0240 1.0185 1.0142
4.1  1.9963 1.2404 1.1356 1.0893 1.0630 1.0461 1.0344 1.0259 1.0195 1.0146 1.0107
5.1  1.9635 1.2267 1.1261 1.0819 1.0570 1.0411 1.0302 1.0223 1.0164 1.0118 1.0082
6.1  1.9371 1.2159 1.1185 1.0761 1.0523 1.0372 1.0269 1.0195 1.0140 1.0097 1.0064
7.1  1.9151 1.2070 1.1124 1.0714 1.0486 1.0342 1.0243 1.0173 1.0121 1.0081 1.0049
8.1  1.8962 1.1994 1.1072 1.0675 1.0454 1.0316 1.0222 1.0155 1.0105 1.0067 1.0037
9.1  1.8798 1.1929 1.1027 1.0641 1.0428 1.0294 1.0204 1.0139 1.0092 1.0055 1.0027
10.1  1.8652 1.1871 1.0988 1.0612 1.0405 1.0275 1.0188 1.0126 1.0080 1.0046 1.0019
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29Footnotes
∗We thank Kurt Van Dender and Ricardo Flores-Fillol for helpful comments. Any errors,
however, are our responsibility.
1The U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce (2000) identiﬁed noise as the greatest environmental
concern at 29 out of the 50 busiest airports.
2Nero and Black (2000) provide an analysis of the eﬀect of per-ﬂight taxes on an airline’s
operations and network structure, motivating such taxation as a noise-abatement measure.
However, their model lacks the richness of the framework developed below. Schipper, Ri-
etveld and Nijkamp (2003) also consider the noise eﬀects of airline deregulation in a model
with frequency competition, but they do not analyze noise-abatement policies. Hsu and Lin
(2005) analyze noise taxation in a complex simulation-based network model.
3The FAA recently adopted a new Stage 4 aircraft noise certiﬁcation standard, which rep-
resents a 10 decibel cumulative noise reduction below the current Stage 3 standard (FAA
(2005)). Glasgow, Leeds, and Heathrow airports in the U.K. also set their own per-aircraft
noise limits and ﬁne operators that exceed the limits.
4For each planning year, AMS establishes an annual total noise volume, which determines
the number of available slots for airline operations, based on the noise characteristics of
forecast ﬂeet composition. If actual airline operations exceed the planned noise limit, the
law requires the airport to curtail operations (Schiphol Group (2003)). LGB imposes a
cumulative noise exposure limit on passenger and cargo airlines. The number of permissible
airline operations at LGB depends on the cumulative noise from operations in the previous
year. If the prior year’s noise were signiﬁcantly less than the limit, the airport could increase
ﬂight slots available to the airlines. But if noise exceeded the limit, the airport would reduce
the number of slots available to those airlines with the noisiest operations (City of Long
Beach Ordinance, Chapter 16.43). At LHR, the noise quotas apply to nighttime operations,
between 11:30 PM and 6 AM (Wit et al. (2003)). Airlines with quieter aircraft may operate
more nighttime ﬂights than those with noisier aircraft.
5Cumulativenoise is computed using a formulathat can be approximated byL = n+10 log(f).
6Note that the consumer compares frequencies for the two duopoly airlines along with the
fares they charge in making a choice between them, without considering the exact timing of
individual ﬂights. While this approach may not be fully accurate for individual consumers,
it could apply to business travelers, who cannot predict their travel times and thus purchase
refundable full-fare tickets on the airline with the best frequency/fare combination, tickets
30that allow them to board the next ﬂight upon arriving at the airport. Alternatively, the
model could capture the choice setting of a corporate travel department, which must sign an
exclusive contract with a particular airline for transporting its employees. The travel depart-
ment cares about the average schedule delay for the company employees, while also seeking
low fares. It signs an exclusive contract with the airline providing the best combination of
these features.
7Whilea representsthe gain from travelingon airline 1 relativeto airline 2, the above condition
requires measurement of the absolute gain from traveling on 1. For an easy transition
between the relativeand absolute cases, it is assumed that when a>0, the absolute gain from
using airline 1 equals a itself while the absolute gain from airline 2 equals zero. Conversely,
when a<0, the absolute gain from airline 1 equals 0 while the absolute gain from airline 2
equals a itself.
8Using the inequality b<p 2 + γ/f2, which holds by assumption, to eliminate b in (6) and
using a> a, it follows that (3) is satisﬁed for all these consumers, indicating that airline 1
is also preferred to airline 2.
9As seen below, the duopoly fare and frequency solutions are independent of b.
10Girvin’s model does not rely on the present brand-loyalty framework, but instead follows
the approach of Brueckner (2004), where brand loyalty is absent but the travel beneﬁt b
varies across consumers. This alternate approach nevertheless yields a traﬃc solution with
the form of (7).
11This requirement reduces to (4γ/α2f3
1)(p1 − τ) − (1/α)2( /L + γ/f2
1)2 > 0.
12Since abatement cost per ﬂight equals  s/n, abatement cost per seat is  /n =  f/L
13Recall that for the duopoly case to be relevant, the inequality b ≥ p + γ/f must hold.
Substituting the p and f solutions from (11) and (12) yields a lower bound for b in terms of
the parameters of the model. An analogous lower bound arises in the other cases considered
below.
14Application of the envelope theorem to the proﬁt expression in (8) shows that airline 1’s
proﬁt is increasing in L holding f2 ﬁxed, indicating that proﬁt falls as regulation is tightened
conditional on f2. But the equilibrium proﬁt of each airline, found by substituting the sym-
metric solutions from (11) and (12) into the proﬁt function is decreasing in L, indicating that
tighter regulation is instead beneﬁcial. This conclusion is counterintuitive, but it evidently
arises from the competitive interaction between the airlines.
3115Although the second-order for the second-stage p1 choice is satisﬁed, the second-order con-
dition for the ﬁrst-stage f1 choice requires f1
3 <α γ / 3θ2, which is assumed to hold.
16One change, however, concerns the proﬁt impact of a tighter noise constraint. The L-
derivative of the ﬁrst-stage proﬁt function can be shown to equal zero, so that the previous
proﬁt impact of the noise limit vanishes (see footnote 14).
17See Girvin (2006b) for details of the derivation. The second-order conditions under simul-
taneous choice require f1 >γ / 2α,o r2 α2/γ > θ, while the second-order condition for the
ﬁrst-stage choice of f1 in the sequential case requires f1 >γ / 3α,o r3 α2/γ > θ.
18Airline proﬁt is now independent of n under both simultaneous and sequential choice.
19As mentioned earlier, Nero and Black (2000) analyze the eﬀect of airline taxes in a related
model where noise per aircraft is ﬁxed and taxes are levied on a per-ﬂight basis, while Hsu
and Lin (2005) analyze the eﬀect of noise taxes in a complex simulation-based network model.
20See Girvin (2006b) for details.
21While noise taxation and cumulative noise regulation are equivalent in the model, a tax may
be superior in the case where the airlines have diﬀerent characteristics (cost per seat for
example). In this case, the optimal cumulative noise limits would diﬀer between the carriers,
while a single noise tax would presumably be desirable (see the welfare analysis below).
22To show ∂f/∂  < 0, note that (25) can be rewritten as

γ
8θL2(L/ )2 +4 L2(L/ )
= t.
Since L is increasing in  , it follows that L/  must be decreasing in   to maintain this equality
as   rises, implying ∂f/∂  < 0f r o m( 2 3 ) . T os h o w∂p/∂  > 0, the term  /n in the price
solution can be rewritten as 2Lt and the previous results for L used.
23For a cost-beneﬁt analysis of the FAA noise regulation, see Morrison, Winston and Watson
(1999).
24Empirical estimates of noise damage are generated through hedonic housing price models.
See McMillen (2004) for a recent example and Nelson (2003) and Schipper, Nijkamp and
Rietveld (1998) for up-to-date surveys.
3225It should be noted that the airport itself, which may earn proﬁts from its operations, is
not considered in the welfare analysis. Such proﬁts would arise from unmodeled charges
levied on the airlines, or from noise taxes under a tax regime. However, since airport proﬁts
represent a transfer from the airlines to the airport, they would cancel in a welfare function
that equals the sum of airline and airport proﬁts and consumer surplus. As a result, the
interests of the airport can be ignored in the welfare analysis. Airport behavior, however,
plays a key role in other types of models; for representative studies, see Morrison (1987),
Oum and Zhang (1990), and Zhang and Zhang (2003).
26With the second-best values of both f and L lower than the ﬁrst-best values, a comparison
of the n levels (given by f/L ratio) is inconclusive.
27Since W and none of the sequential f solutions depend on α, the value of this parameter
need not be speciﬁed. Recalling that satisfaction of the airline second-order conditions in
the ﬁrst stage of sequential case is not guaranteed, it can then be assumed that α takes a
value such that these conditions hold.
28The full set of numerical results is available in Girvin (2006b). In contrast to Proposition
7, numerical examples in Girvin (2006a) show that, in the monopoly case, cumulative noise
regulation is slightly superior to per-aircraft regulation everywhere in her chosen parameter
space. This ﬁnding, of course, does not establish a general result.
29These aircraft include the Boeing 777, 737-700 to -900, and 717, along with the Airbus
A320/321, A330 and A340.
33